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   Family businesses are very widespread in the world and occupy the important 
position in the economic sphere. In recent years, family business research has 
attracted the close attentions of scholars and increasingly become a hot topic. 
Meanwhile, dividend policy is one of the most enduring and fascinating research 
topics in the financial field over the half a century, and the “dividend puzzle” remains 
an open problem so far. According to the literature, there are very poor researches on 
family business based on the finance perspective at home and abroad, and among 
which are little systematic studies about the dividend policy. This dissertation aims to 
deeply study the dividend policy of Chinese listed companies, so as to make up 
deficiency of existing literature to some extent. The significance of this research are 
enhancing understanding the behaviors of family businesses and enriching the 
existing family business and dividend policy research. 
Based on related literature and analysis of the unique institutional background 
and the status quo and the characteristics of family listed companies in China, this 
paper empirically tests the differences of the dividend policy between family listed 
companies and non-family listed companies using the sample of 2004~2008 Chinese 
A-share listed companies. Then, this paper attempts to explore the deep-seated 
motivation for the relative passive dividend policy of family listed companies. Finally, 
from the internal and external perspectives, this paper examines the positive impacts 
of the institutional investors and the governance environment (i.e., marketization, 
legal environment and financial development) on the dividend policy of family listed 
companies. Thus, this paper develops a framework for studying dividend policy of 
Chinese family listed companies, that is, whether and why the dividend policy of 
family listed companies different from the non-family listed companies, and what 
influences the dividend policy of family listed companies. 
This paper consists of eight chapters. Major contents of each chapter are outlined 
as follow: 
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, 
















Chapter2 is the literature review. In this chapter, the author reviews and 
comments on the literature about the definition of family business, the related theory 
and empirical research on family business and dividend policy. 
Chapter3 analyses the unique institutional background in China and the status 
quo and the characteristics of Chinese family listed companies. In this chapter, the 
author sums up the course of the development of private firms over the past three 
decades, makes detail statistics of the characteristics of family listed companies, and 
investigates the the status quo of listed companies’ dividend policy. 
Chapter 4 empirically studies whether family control has great influences on 
dividend policy of listed companies. Based on two perspectives, i.e., family control 
and the characteristics of family control, this chapter examines the differences of the 
dividend policy between family listed companies and non-family listed companies 
and among family listed companies. 
Chapter 5 researches the motivations of the relative passive dividend policy of 
family listed companies. Based on agency theory, tax hypothesis and financial 
constraint, this chapter tries to explain the empirical results of chapter 4, that is, why 
family listed companies has significantly lower dividend payout comparing to 
non-family listed companies. 
Chapter 6 empirically tests the relationships among family control, institutional 
investors and dividend policy of listed companies. The author investigates whether 
institutional investors as one of the internal governance mechanisms has great 
influences on dividend policy of listed companies, especially the family listed 
companies. Furthermore, whether the heterogeneous institutional investors have 
different impacts on dividend policy and different preferences for dividend policy. 
Chapter 7 examines the relationships among family control, governance 
environment and dividend policy of listed companies. On the basis of Chapter 6, the 
author further explores whether the governance environment (i.e., marketization, legal 
environment and financial development) as one of the external governance 
mechanisms has important impacts on dividend policy of listed companies, especially 
the family listed companies, and if so, through what channels achieving that impacts. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the research findings and draws conclusions, shows the 
research implications, and points out the research limitations and the direction for 
further research. 















Firstly, family listed companies are very widespread in Chinese capital markets, 
and shows significant features in the industry and geographical distribution, the 
structure of control right and internal governance structure. Up to the end of 2008, 
there are about one-third of Chinese A-share listed companies controlled by family, 
which gathers in the traditional manufacturing industry and several emerging 
industries like technology and the real estate industry, and are mainly distributed in 
southeastern coastal areas like Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and other rich provinces. 
The ultimate controlling family shareholders own 27.35% of the cash flow rights to 
control 35.32% of the voting right, which shows the great separation of ownership and 
control. Also, family members hold executive positions in 70% family listed 
companies, showing that family are closely involved in the management. Furthermore, 
there are systematic differences of internal governance structure between family listed 
companies and non-family listed companies. 
Secondly, family control and the characteristics of family control significantly 
affect the dividend policy. Comparing to the non-family listed companies, family 
listed companies has relative passive dividend policy, the dividend payout ratio of  
the former is about 50% higher than the latter. Meanwhile, family influences (i.e., 
family involved in management, whether or not tight control) and the structure of 
family control (i.e., whether or not direct listing, whether or not the pyramid control, 
the number of control hierarchy and control chain) have significant impacts on 
dividend policy, while the ultimate control right of the family (i.e., ownership, control, 
separation of ownership and control) has weak influences on dividend policy. 
Thirdly, the agency theory combined with financial constraints hypothesis 
provide a relatively complete and reasonable explanation to the relative passive 
dividend policy of family listed companies. The empirical results show that, (1) 
family control do not results in severe agency problem II from the perspective of 
funds occupation; (2) on agency problem I, there is a concurrence of the “convergence 
effects” and “entrenchment effects” of family control, and the characteristics of family 
control determines the role of family control and thus the dividend policy; (3) in the 
background of dividend tax adjustment, dividend policy of family listed companies 
show no significant differences from non-family listed companies; (4) financial 
constraint significantly reduce the dividend payout of family listed companies. 
Fourthly, the results also show that, the higher institutional holdings the higher 















companies the higher institutional holdings. Furthermore, institutional investors have 
significant positive impacts on the dividend payout of family listed companies, and 
the heterogeneous institutional investors have similar impacts. 
Fifthly, the better external governance environment (i.e., marketization, legal 
environment and financial development) the higher dividend payout of listed 
companies, especially the family listed companies. The story how governance 
environment achieves its impacts is that, marketization is a substitution mechanism 
for the “convergence effects” of family control, and legal environment weaken the 
“entrenchment effects” of family control, and the financial development relax the 
financial constraints facing by family listed companies to some extent. 
This research is an exploratory work, and the major improvements and 
innovations are as follows: 
First of all, to the best of my knowledge, with regard to the research content, this 
paper is the first one to systematically investigate the relationship between family 
control and dividend policy of listed companies, which enrichs the family business 
literature, promotes the understanding of the behaviors and corporate governance of 
family businesses, and also provides a new perspective for the dividend policy 
research. 
Next, in terms of the research contents, this paper is the first one to examine the 
impacts of family control on the dividend policy of listed companies, which is quite 
different from other types of controlling large shareholders. A large amount of 
domestic research literature show that, controlling large shareholders have a strong 
incentive to distribute dividends so as to liquidate their non-tradable shareholdings 
(Yuan, 2001; Chen et al., 2003; Ma et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009). While this paper 
finds that family shareholders as a form of controlling large shareholders do not have 
a strong desire to distribute dividends, on the contrary, they prefer the relative passive 
dividend policy, showing that the heterogeneous controlling large shareholders have 
different impacts on dividend policy and different preferences for dividend policy. 
Finally, in terms of the empirical tests, there are also some certain innovations in 
this paper. First, this paper is the first one to use the agency theory, tax hypothesis and 
financial constraint to examine the family listed companies’ motivations for dividend 
policy, which enhances the understanding of family listed companies’ behaviors and 
extends the scope of application of relevant theories. Second, this paper confirms and 















besides the law environment, the broader external governance environment (e.g., 
marketization and financial development) has important impacts on behaviors of 
listed companies. Third, this paper is the first one to research the interaction between 
different corporate governance mechanisms. Based on the perspective of dividend 
policy, this paper examines the impacts of institutional investors and external 
governance environment on family control. Fourth, this paper is also the first one to 
explore the mechanisms how the external governance environment affects dividend 
policy of listed companies, and thus playes a positive role in corporate governance. 
The implications of this paper lie in two aspects. First, as for the family listed 
companies, they should pay attention to dividend policy and establish a scientific and 
rational dividend distribution system. At the same time, the family listed companies 
should also continually improve their internal governance mechanisms, like attracting 
institutional investors holding, and actively use the external environment, like 
broadening the financing channels and obtaining the favorable policy and resource 
supports, etc. Second, as for the government agencies and securities regulators, they 
should actively guide and regulate the dividend policy of family listed companies, and 
promote the improvement of the family listed companies’ corporate governance 
mechanisms and develop rational and sophisticated institutional investors, and 
improve the external environment so as to provide policy supports and institutional 
protection for the family business or the more extensive private enterprises. 
The limitations of this paper are that the definition of family business is still a 
much-debated problem. Meanwhile, this paper examines only three types of 
motivations for family listed companies’ dividend policy, while there may be other 
factors not taken into account. Moreover, it’s hard to directly measure the “tunnelling 
effects”, “convergence effects” and the “entrenchment effects” of family control. Also, 
this paper just focuses on dividend payout propensity and ratio, without taking into 
accout of other characteristics of dividend policy. Future research should focus on 
remedying these deficiencies. Furthermore, family business research, based on other 
financial perspectives (e.g., capital structure, information disclosure, earnings 
management, etc.) or the broad cross-disciplinary perspectives (e.g., economics, 
management, sociology, etc.), is worthy of more attention in the future. 
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